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Abstract
We study two-player contests in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to
expend effort on her behalf; neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when
the delegates choose their effort levels.  We obtain first the outcomes of this unobservable-
contracts case.  Next, we perform comparative statics of these outcomes with respect to the
higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize.  Finally, we compare the outcomes of the
unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case.  We find, among other
things, that the unobservability of delegation contracts narrows the gap between the delegates'
equilibrium contingent compensation.
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11   Introduction
Delegation in a contest a situation in which, in order to win a prize, each player or contestant
hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player's behalf can be readily observed all
around us.   Examples include attorney delegation in litigation, lobbyist delegation in rent-1
seeking contests, researcher delegation in patent contests, and strategic managerial delegation.
In some contests, delegation occurs because it is compulsory.  In others, delegation may occur
because players want to use superior ability of delegates, and/or try to achieve strategic
commitments.
 In contests with delegation, one may well expect that delegates may choose their effort
levels without observing the rival parties' delegation contracts.  This unobservability of
delegation contracts may occur because the parties do not announce their delegation contracts, or
because their announced delegation contracts are not verifiable.  For example, in litigation
between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney to expend effort on
the litigant's behalf, the attorney for each side may choose his effort level without observing the
contract of the other side.
 Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to study contests with delegation in which
delegation contracts are private information.  To the best of our knowledge, such contests with
delegation have not previously been studied.
 We study two-player contests with bilateral delegation in which neither party's delegation
contract is revealed to the rival party when the two delegates choose their effort levels.
Specifically, we set up and analyze the following game.  First, the players hire delegates and
independently write contracts with their delegates.  Next, the delegates choose their effort levels
simultaneously and independently, each choosing his effort level without observing the contract
for his counterpart.  Finally, the winning player is determined, and each player pays
compensation to her delegate according to her contract for him.  The players use contracts that
2condition delegates' compensation on the outcome, win or lose, of the contest.  The probability
that a player wins the prize depends on the delegates' effort levels.
 We solve the game called the unobservable-contracts case treating it as a 
simultaneous-move game between the two parties.   Then, we examine how the outcomes of the2
game respond when the ratio of the players' valuations for the prize changes more specifically,
when the higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize changes, .  Finally, weceteris paribus
compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts
case, the game that is the same as the one presented above with the exception that each party's
delegation contract is observable to the rival party more specifically, when choosing their
effort levels, the delegates know the delegation contracts of both parties.   Here we find that the3
unobservability of delegation contracts narrows, compared with the observable-contracts case,
the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation, which in turn leads to
several interesting results.
 This paper is related to the literature on delegation in contests: See, for example, Baik
and Kim (1997), Warneryd (2000), Schoonbeek (2002, 2004, 2007), Konrad, Peters, and..
Warneryd (2004), Lim and Shogren (2004), Krakel (2005), Krakel and Sliwka (2006), Baik.. .. ..
(2007, 2008), Brandauer and Englmaier (2009), and Baik and Lee (2013).   In this literature,4
unlike in the current paper, a standard assumption is that, when choosing their effort levels,
delegates know the delegation contracts, if any, of the rival parties in other words, public
information is assumed regarding delegation contracts.  On the other hand, as in the current
paper, most of the above-mentioned papers study delegation in two-player contests, and assume
that the delegates' compensation specified in the delegation contracts is conditioned on the
outcome of the contest.  Baik and Kim (1997) study contests in which the delegation contracts
are exogenous and each player has the option of hiring a delegate.  Warneryd (2000) studies..
contests with bilateral delegation in which the delegation contracts are endogenous.  Schoonbeek
(2002) considers a contest in which only one player has the option of hiring a delegate and the
delegation contract is endogenous.  Schoonbeek (2004) considers a contest between two groups
3in which each group decides whether or not to hire a delegate and the delegation contracts are
endogenous.  Schoonbeek (2007) considers a contest with endogenous delegation contracts in
which each player has the option of hiring a delegate and the delegates have more instruments
than the players.  Lim and Shogren (2004) study an environmental conflict with unilateral
delegation in which the delegation contract is exogenous.  Baik (2007, 2008) considers contests
with bilateral delegation in which the delegation contracts are endogenous.  Baik and Lee (2013)
study contests with bilateral delegation in which the delegates decide endogenously when to
expend their effort.
 This paper is related also to Baik and Lee (2007) and Nitzan and Ueda (2011).  These
papers assume, as in the main model of this paper, that each party chooses its two sequential
moves without observing the other parties' moves.  The two papers study collective rent seeking
between groups in which the players in each group decide first how to share the rent among
themselves if they win, and then choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently
without observing the sharing rules to which the players in the other groups agreed.
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 formulates a game that models a two-player
contest with bilateral delegation in which each party's contract is unobservable to the rival party.
In Section 3, solving the game, we obtain the equilibrium contracts and the delegates'
equilibrium effort levels.  In Section 4, we first obtain all the outcomes of the unobservable-
contracts case, and then perform comparative statics of these outcomes with respect to the
higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize.  In Section 5, we first look at the observable-
contracts case.  Then we compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of
the observable-contracts case.  Finally, Section 6 offers our conclusions.
2   The Main Model: The Unobservable-Contracts Case
Consider a contest between two players, 1 and 2, in which, in order to win a prize, each player
hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf.  The contract between a player and her delegate is
4hidden from the rival party when the two delegates, 1 and 2, choose their effort levels.   The5
probability that a player wins the prize depends on the delegates' effort levels.
 This situation is formally modeled as the following game.  First, the players hire
delegates and independently write contracts with their delegates.   Naturally, each delegate6
observes the contract for himself.  But he cannot observe the contract for his counterpart.  Next,
the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently.   Finally, the winning7
player is determined, and each player (or only the winning player, as will be clear shortly) pays
compensation to her delegate according to her contract with him.
 Player 1's valuation for the prize is , and player 2's valuation is , where .  Wev v v v1 2 1 2 
assume that each player's valuation for the prize is positive, measured in monetary units, and
publicly known.  Each delegate bears the cost of expending his effort.  Delegates' effort levels
are not verifiable to a third party, so that the players cannot use contracts that base delegates'
compensation on their effort levels.  We assume that the players use contracts that condition
delegates' compensation on the outcome of the contest:  Player  pays delegate compensation ofi i 
α αi i iv  if she wins the prize, and zero if she loses it, where 0 1.   We call compensation of  8
αi iv  i contingent compensationdelegate 's .
 We assume that the delegates are risk-neutral, and have a reservation wage of 0.
Delegate signs up for player  only if player  offers him a contract or, equivalently, a valuei i i 
of under which he can earn an expected payoff greater than or equal to his reservation wageαi 
(given his beliefs about the rival party's behavior).
 Let  represent the effort level that delegate  expends.  Each delegate's effort level isx ii
nonnegative, and measured in monetary units.  Let ( , ) denote the probability that player p x  x ii 1 2
wins the prize when delegate 1 expends  and delegate 2 expends .  We assume that thex x1 2
contest success function for player  isi 9
(1) ( , ) ( ) for 0   p x  x  x x x x xi i1 2 1 2 1 2œ  Î 
     1 2  for 0.Î œ œx x1 2
5This function says that, , each player's probability of winning is increasing in herceteris paribus
delegate's effort level at a decreasing rate; it is decreasing in the rival delegate's effort level at a
decreasing rate.  Function (1) implies that the delegates have equal ability for the contest.
 We assume that the players too are risk-neutral.  Let represent the expected payoff forG  i
player .  Then the payoff function for player  isi i
(2)    (1 ) ( , ).G  v  p x  xi i i iœ  α 1 2
Let represent the expected payoff for delegate .  Then the payoff function for delegate  is1i i i
(3)    ( , ) .1i i i i iœ  v  p x x  xα 1 2
Expected payoffs to player  and delegate do not depend directly on , for , 1, 2 with .i i i  j i jαj œ Á
However, they depend indirectly on  because  affects .   Note that, to choose their optimalα αj j jx 10
strategies at the start of the game, the players and the delegates should compute their expected
payoffs at the start of the game, forming their beliefs about both parties' contracts and the
delegates' effort levels to be chosen.
 Finally, we assume that all of the above is common knowledge among the players and
delegates.
3   Equilibrium Contracts and Effort Levels
To solve the game, we need to find a quadruple vector ( , , , ) of actions that satisfies theα α* * * *1 1 2 2x x
following two requirements.   First, each delegate's effort level is optimal given the contract for11
him and given the rival party's effort level (or, precisely, the effort level of the delegate in the 
rival party).  Second, each player's contract is optimal given the rival party's effort level and
given the behavior of her own delegate that follows.   Note that it makes sense to say that the12
pair ( , ) of actions of party  is a best response to the pair ( , ) of actions of party α α* * * *i i j jx i x j
because, as mentioned in footnote 7, the two parties play a simultaneous-move game.
6 To find such a quadruple vector of actions the equilibrium contracts and effort
levels for the game, we begin by obtaining party 's best response to a pair ( , ) of actions of i xαj j
party .  Now that party 's best response to ( , ) consists of player 's best response to ( , )j i x i xα αj j j j
and delegate 's best response to ( , ), working backward, we consider first delegate 'si x iαj j
decision on his effort level, and then consider player 's decision on her contract.i 13
 Consider delegate 's decision on his effort level.  After observing player 's contract ,i i αi
delegate  seeks to maximize his expected payoff (3) over his effort level , taking delegate 'si x ji
effort level  as given.  From the first-order condition for maximizing function (3), we obtainxj
(4)   ( , )   ,x x v x  xi i j i i j jα œ α
where ( , ) denotes delegate 's best response to delegate 's effort level .x x i j xi i j jα 14
 Next, consider player 's decision on her contract.  Taking delegate 's effort level  asi j xj
given, player  seeks to maximize her expected payoff (2) over her contract , having perfecti αi
foresight about ( , ) for each  value of .  More precisely, player seeks to maximizex x i i i j iα α
(5)   ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) { ( , ) }G x  v  x x x x xi i j i i i i j i i j jα α αœ  α Î
with respect to , taking  as given.  Note that we obtain function (5) using functions (1) andαi jx
(2), and delegate 's best response (4).  The first-order condition for maximizing function (5)i
reduces to
(6)   4 2   0.v x x xi j j i ji iα α α3 2   œ
Solving equation (6) for , we obtain player 's best response to delegate 's effort level , whichαi ji j x
is denoted by ( ).αi jx
 We now obtain the reaction functions for the parties.  Party  has two reaction functions,i
one for delegate  and one for player .  Delegate 's reaction function comes from delegate 'si i i i
7best response (4), so that it is ( , ) or, equivalently, .  Player 'sx x x x v x x ii i i j i i i j jœ œα α 
reaction function is ( ), the implicit form of which is given in equation (6).α αi i jœ x  
 Finally, we obtain the equilibrium contracts and effort levels, ( , , , ), for theα α* * * *1 1 2 2x x
game.  Because they satisfy all the four reaction functions of the parties simultaneously, we
obtain them by solving the following system of four simultaneous equations:
(7)   4 2   0,v   x   x   x1 2 2 1 23 21 1α α α   œ
(8)    ,x   v x  x1 1 1 2 2œ α 
(9)   4 2   0,v   x   x   x2 1 1 2 13 22 2α α α   œ
  and
(10)    .x   v x  x2 2 2 1 1œ α 
It is computationally intractable to obtain the equilibrium contracts and effort levels, ( , , ,α α* * *1 1 2x
x x*2 1 1 2), by substituting player 1's reaction function ( ) into equation (8), and player 2'sα αœ
reaction function ( ) into equation (10), then solving the resulting pair of simultaneousα α2 2 1œ x
equations for  and , and so on.  Accordingly, we use the following trick that we discovered tox x1 2
get around the intractableness.  Let , where  is a parameter greater than or equal tov v1 2œ ) )
unity.  Let , where  is a positive  to be solved for below.  Then we have, inx tx t unknown* *1 2œ
equilibrium,
(11)   4 ( )  ( )  2   0,)v  x  x   x2 1 2 1 2 1 23 2α α α* * * * * *   œ
(12)   (1 ) ,x   v t* *2 12 2œ ) α Î 
(13)   4 ( )  ( )  2   0,v  tx  tx   tx2 2 2 2 2 2 23 2α α α* * * * * *   œ
  and
8(14)   (1 ) ,x   tv t* *2 22 2œ α Î 
which come from equations (7) through (10), respectively.  Next, using equations (11) through
(14), we obtain
(15)   1 (1 2 ),α*1  tœ Î 
(16)   (1 ) (1 2 ),x   tv t t*1 2 2œ ) Î  
(17)   (2 ),α*2  t tœ Î 
  and
(18)   (1 ) (2 ).x   t v t t*2 2 22œ Î  
As the final step, we solve for the unknown , using the relationship  and equations (16)t x tx* *1 2œ
and (18), which reduce to
(19)   2    2   0.t t  t  3 2 œ ) )
 Now, using the above results, we report the equilibrium contracts and effort levels, ( ,α*1
x x* * *1 2 2, , ), in Lemma 1 (see Figures 1 and 2).α
LEMMA 1   1 (1 2 ), (2 ), (1 ) (1 2 ),  We obtain t t t x tv t t and xα α )* * * 2 *1 2 1 22œ Î  Î  Î  œ œ œ
t v t t where t is a unique positive real root of equation 2 2 152Î  (1 ) (2 ), (19).
 Note that  in Lemma 1 is a positive real for any value of , where 1; it is equal tot ) )  
unity for 1; and it is monotonically increasing in .  Note also that  and  do not depend) ) α αœ * *1 2
separately on player 1's valuation for the prize and player 2's valuation , but only on thev  v1 2
parameter , the ratio of the players' valuations (of player 1 to player 2).)
94   Comparative Statics with respect to the Parameter )
In this section, we first look at the players' contracts, the delegates' effort levels, the players'
probabilities of winning, and the expected payoffs of the delegates and the players in the
equilibrium of the game.  Then, we examine how these outcomes of the game respond when the
asymmetry between the players changes that is, we perform comparative statics of these
outcomes with respect to the parameter .)
 Let ( , ) represent the probability that player  wins the prize in the equilibrium.  Letp x x ii * *1 2
1*i i* and  represent the expected payoff for delegate  and that for player  respectively, in theG i i,
equilibrium.  Then, using Lemma 1 and functions (1) through (3), we obtain Propositions 1 and 2
(see Figures 1 through 4).
PROPOSITION 1   1, 1 3, 12, ( , ) 1 2,If  then we obtain x x v p x x) α αœ œ Î Î Î* * * *1 2 1 2 1 22 1œ œ œ œ* *
1 1* *1 2 1 22 2œ œ œ œv and G G vÎ Î12, 3.* *
PROPOSITION 2   1, ( ) 1 3   , ( ) ,If then we obtain a and v v  b x x) α α α α  Î   * * * * * *1 2 1 2 1 21 2
( ) ( , ) (2 ) [ (2 ) (1 2 )] 1 2, ( ) (1 ) (1 2 ) c p x x t t t t d t v t t and1 21 2 1* 2 2* * œ œ) ) 1 ) Î     Î Î  
1 1 1 )* 2 * * 22 1 2 12 2œ œtv t t so that e  G t v t t andÎ     Î  (1 ) (2 ), 0, ( ) 2 (1 )(1 2 ) *
G v t t so that G G and f  G  for i* * * *i i2 1 22 *œ œ2 (1 )(2 ), 0, ( )  1, 2.Î      1
 Proposition 2 says that, in equilibrium, the lower-valuation player (player 2) offers her
delegate a higher value of  than the higher-valuation player, but her delegate (delegate 2) exertsα
less effort than his counterpart.  This can be explained as follows.  Player 2 (the lower-valuation
player) offers delegate 2 a higher value of  than player 1.  However, delegate 2's contingentα
compensation is less than delegate 1's that is, because player 2's valuation for α α* *2 12 1v v
the prize is lower than player 1's.  Consequently, delegate 2 is less motivated, and thus expends
less effort than his counterpart.
10
 Another interesting observation from Proposition 2 is that there may be a case where 
player 2's equilibrium contract  is greater than one half that is, player 2 (the lower-valuationα*2 
player) pays her delegate more than half her valuation for the prize if she wins the prize.  Indeed,
using Lemma 1, we confirm that 1 2 for 5.  Note, however, that according to part ( ),α )*2  Î  f
player 2's equilibrium expected payoff is always even for 5 greater than delegate 2's.  )
 Part ( ) says that the equilibrium expected payoffs for the delegates differ.  The reasond
for this is not because the delegates possess different bargaining power or ability.  Both delegates
are identical before they are hired.  Intuitively, the delegates' expected payoffs differ because the
competition between the players to win the prize drives them to offer different contingent
compensation to their delegates.  Accordingly, the result that the delegates' expected payoffs
differ does not depend on how many potential delegates exist at the start of the game.
 Part ( ) says also that each delegate's equilibrium expected payoff is greater than hisd
reservation wage.   This economic rent for each delegate is created sheerly by the competition16
between the players to win the prize more specifically, by the players' strategic decisions on
their delegates' compensation.
 Now, using Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, we examine the effects of increasing the
parameter more specifically, those of increasing player 1's valuation for the prize, )  v  ceteris1
paribus  on the outcomes of the game.  Proposition 3 summarizes the comparative statics
results (see Figures 1 through 4).
PROPOSITION 3   , ( )    , ( ) As  increases from unity a decreases while increases b both v) α α α* * *1 2 1 1
and v  increase but the gap between v  and v  widens c delegate 's equilibrium effortα α α* * *2 1 22 1 2,  , ( ) 1
level x increases while delegate 's equilibrium effort level x increases for a while but  2   1 2* *
eventually decreases  d the gap between x  and x  widens e the equilibrium total effort level, ( )  , ( ) ,1 2* *
x x  increases f player 's probability of winning increases while player 's decreases and1 2* * , , ( )  1  2 , 
( )  1  1 2g delegate 's and player 's equilibrium expected payoffs each increase while delegate 's and
player 's equilibrium expected payoffs each decrease 2 .
11
 The following complements Proposition 3.  As  approaches (plus) infinity, (i) the limit)
of player 1's equilibrium contract  is zero and that of player 2's equilibrium contract  isα α* *1 2
unity, (ii) the limit of delegate 1's equilibrium contingent compensation  is infinity, that ofα*1 1v
delegate 2's equilibrium contingent compensation  is , and that of  is infinity,α α α* * *2 1 22 2 1 2v v v v
(iii) the limit of  is , that of  is zero, that of  is , and that of  is , (iv) thex v x x x v x x v1 2 1 2 1 2* * * * * *2 2 2 
limit of player 1's probability of winning is unity, and (v) the limits of delegate 1's and player 1's
equilibrium expected payoffs are infinity, and the limits of delegate 2's and player 2's
equilibrium expected payoffs are zero.
 Part ( ) says that, as the valuation of the higher-valuation player (or player 1)b v  1
increases, , each player makes her delegate more aggressive or stronger byceteris paribus
offering him greater contingent compensation.  According to part ( ), the lower-valuation playera
(or player 2) offers her delegate greater contingent compensation by offering a higher value of α
than before.  By contrast, due to an increase in her valuation, the higher-valuation player offers
her delegate greater contingent compensation with a lower value of  than before.α
 Part ( ) says that, as the valuation of the higher-valuation player increases, e v  ceteris1
paribus v, the equilibrium total effort level increases.  This can be explained by the fact that, as 1
increases (or, equivalently, as  increases), both  and  increase, so that the delegates) α α* *1 21 2v v
engage in fiercer because it is in contrast with previous competition.  Part ( ) is interesting e
results in the literature on the theory of contests.  For example, studying two-player asymmetric
contests with bilateral delegation in which each party's contract is observable to the rival party
and delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort, Baik and Lee (2013) show that,
as the valuation of the higher-valuation player increases, the equilibrium total effort level
remains unchanged.17
 Another interesting result in Proposition 3 is that, as  approaches (plus) infinity, the)
limit of the equilibrium total effort level is .  This implies that the equilibrium total effort levelv2
is always less than the valuation of the lower-valuation player.v  2
12
 Part ( ) says that, as the valuation of the higher-valuation player increases, f v  ceteris1
paribus d, her probability of winning increases.  This follows immediately from part ( ), which in
turn follows from part ( ).b
5   Comparison with the Case of Observable Contracts
So far we have studied two-player contests with bilateral delegation in which each party's
contract is unobservable to the rival party.  In this section, we study first contests with bilateral
delegation in which each party's contract is  to the rival party.  Then we compare theobservable
outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case, which are provided in Lemma 1 and Propositions 1
and 2, with those of the observable-contracts case, which are provided in Lemmas A1 and A2 in
the Appendix.
 Consider a contest that is the same as the one in Section 2 with the exception that, when
choosing their effort levels, the delegates know the contracts of both parties.  Specifically,
consider the following two-stage game.  In the first stage, the players hire delegates and
independently write contracts with their delegates, and then they simultaneously announce (and
commit to) the contracts that is, player 1 announces publicly the value of , and player 2 α1
announces the value of .   In the second stage, after knowing both contracts, the delegatesα2 18
choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently.  The winning player is determined
at the end of the second stage, and only the winning player pays compensation to her delegate
according to her contract announced in the first stage.
 To solve for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this standard two-stage game, we work
backwards.  In the second stage, the delegates know the contracts of both parties: the value of α1
and the value of .  Delegate  seeks to maximize his expected payoff (3) over his effort level ,α2 i xi
taking delegate 's effort level  as given.  From the first-order condition for maximizingj xj
function (3), we obtain delegate 's best response ( ) to .  Delegate 's reaction function,i b x x ii j j
13
x b x ji i jœ ( ), which shows his best response to every possible effort level that delegate  might
choose, is then
   x v x  xi i i j j   ,œ α
for , 1, 2 with .  Using these reaction functions for the delegates, we obtain the Nashi  j i jœ Á
equilibrium of the second-stage subgame:19
   x v v v v1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 21 12 2 2( , )  ( )α α œ Îα α α α
(20)  and
   x v v v v2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 22 22 2 2( , )  ( ) .α α œ Îα α α α
 Next, consider the first stage in which the players choose their contracts.  In this stage,
taking player 's contract  as given, player  seeks to maximize her expected payoff (2) over herj iαj
contract , having perfect foresight about the delegates' optimal strategies or, equivalently,αi 
having perfect foresight about both ( , ) and ( , ) for any values of  and .  Morex x1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2α α α α α α
precisely, player seeks to maximizei 
(21)   ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) { ( , ) ( , )}G  v  x x xi i i iα α α α α α α α1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2œ  α Î
with respect to , taking  as given.  Note that we obtain function (21) by substituting theα αi j
delegates' effort levels, ( , ) and ( , ), in (20) into function (2).  From the first-orderx x1 1 2 2 1 2α α α α
condition for maximizing function (21), we obtain player 's best response ( ) to .  Player 'si r ii j jα α
reaction function, ( ), which shows her best response to every possible value of  thatα α αi i j jœ r
player  might choose, is thenj
    ( ) ,αi j j j ij jœ  v v v v vα α α1 2 2 2 Î
for , 1, 2 with .  Using these reaction functions for the players, we will obtain thei  j i jœ Á
players' contracts,  and , which are specified in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of theα α** **1 2
14
two-stage game.  As in Section 3, let , where 1.  Then the reaction functions ofv v1 2œ  ) )
player 1 and player 2 are rewritten as, respectively,
(22)   ( )α ) )1 2 222  œ α α α Î
  and
(23)   .α ) ) )2 1 112 2  œ α α α
The equilibrium contracts of the players satisfy these reaction functions simultaneously.  Let
α α** **1 2œ k k unknown, where  is a positive  to be solved for below.  Then we have, in
equilibrium,
(24)   1 (2 )α )**1 œ Î  k
  and
(25)   (1 2 ).α ) )**2 œ k kÎ 
which come from equations (22) and (23), respectively.  Next, we solve for the unknown , usingk
the relationship  and equations (24) and (25), which reduce toα α** **1 2œ k
(26)     2  2 1  0.) ) )2 3 2k k  k   œ 
Finally, substituting a unique positive real root of equation (26) into equations (24) and (25),
respectively, we obtain the equilibrium contracts,  and , of the players (see Figure 1).α α** ** 201 2
 Let  represent the equilibrium effort level of delegate .  Let ( , ) represent thex i p x x** ** **i i 1 2
probability that player  wins the prize in the subgame-perfect equilibrium.  Let  and i G1**i i**
represent the equilibrium expected payoff for delegate  and that for player , respectively.  Then,i i
substituting the equilibrium contracts,  and , of the parties into (20) and using functionsα α** **1 2
(1) through (3), we obtain Lemmas A1 and A2 in the Appendix (see Figures 1 through 4).
 Now, using Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemmas 1, A1, and A2, we compare the outcomes
of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case.  First, i 1,f ) œ
then yield the same outcomes.  That is, tthe two cases he unobservability of delegation contracts
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makes no difference, as compared to the observable-contracts case, players have the sameif the 
valuation for the prize.  Next, the outcomes of the two cases when 1.Proposition 4 compares ) 
The superscripts * and ** in Proposition 4 indicate the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts
case and those of the observable-contracts case, respectively.
PROPOSITION 4   1, ( )   , ( )  If  then we obtain a and b x x unless  is) α α α α * ** * ** * **1 1 2 2 1 1  )
large x x and x x x x c p x x p x x d and, , , ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )  2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1* ** * * ** ** * **1 1    * * ** ** 1 1
1 1* ** 212 2 1 1 2 2 ,  ( )  , , .and e G G and  unless  is extremely large  G G* ** * ** )
 Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figures 1 through 4.  Proposition 4 says that, in
equilibrium, the higher-valuation player (or player 1) offers her delegate greater contingent
compensation in the observable-contracts case than in the unobservable-contracts case, whereas
the lower-valuation player (or player 2) offers her delegate greater contingent compensation in
the unobservable-contracts case than in the observable-contracts case:  andα α* **1 11 1v v
α α α α α α* ** 22 ** * * **2 2 2 2 1 12 2 2 2 1 1v v v v v v .   This, together with Proposition 2, yields .  
Clearly, as compared to the observable-contracts case, the unobservability of contracts narrows
the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation:
α α α α* * ** ** 231 2 1 21 2 1 2v v v v   .
  says that total effort level is greater Proposition 4  the equilibrium in the unobservable-
contracts case in the observable-contracts case.   Not surprisingly, this arises because the than 24
delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation gets closer so that their competition gets
fiercer in the unobservable-contracts case in the observable-contracts case.  On the basis  than 
of this result, we may argue that the contest organizer or the decision-maker, if any, who wants
to induce more effort from contestants prefers the unobservable-contracts case (to the
observable-contracts case).  On the other hand, in two-player rent-seeking contests with bilateral
delegation, the observable-contracts case reduces social costs associated with rent seeking,
compared with the unobservable-contracts case.   We may then argue that one way to lower25
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social costs in such contests is to create an environment in which both parties release the
information on their contracts.
 Another interesting res is thault in Proposition 4 t the equilibrium expected payoffs of the
higher-valuation player and her delegate respectively, in the unobservable-contracts, are less 
case in the observable-contracts case, nless  is very much greater than  (or, than whereas, u v v1 2
equivalently, unless  is extremely large), the lower-) the equilibrium expected payoffs of 
valuation player and her delegate respectively, in the unobservable-contracts case, are greater 
than  this result, we argue that in the observable-contracts case.   On the basis of the higher-26
valuation player and her delegate prefer the observable-contracts case (to the unobservable-
contracts case), while the lower-valuation player and her delegate prefer the unobservable-
contracts case.  We argue also that is beneficial to the lower-valuation player and her delegate,it 
but harmful to to the higher-valuation player and her delegate, enact or establish policies or
regulations or institutions that require both parties to release the information on their contracts in
a two-player contest with bilateral delegation.
6   Conclusions
We have studied two-player contests with bilateral delegation in which each party's delegation
contract is not revealed to (or is hidden from) the rival party when the two delegates choose their
effort levels.
 In Section 3, we solved the game, treating it as a simultaneous-move game between the
two parties.  In Section 4, we obtained first the players' contracts, the delegates' effort levels, the
players' probabilities of winning, and the expected payoffs of the delegates and the players, in
the equilibrium of the game.  Then, we examined how these outcomes of the game respond when
the valuation parameter  changes.  In the same section, we showed that, in equilibrium, the)
higher-valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation than her rival does,
the expected payoff of the delegate hired by the higher-valuation player is greater than that of his
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counterpart, and economic rent exists for each delegate.  We showed also that, as the valuation
for the prize of the higher-valuation player increases, , each player offers herceteris paribus
delegate greater contingent compensation and the equilibrium total effort level increases.
Finally, we showed that the equilibrium total effort level is always less than the valuation for the
prize of the lower-valuation player.
 In Section 5, to make comparisons, we first studied two-player contests with bilateral
delegation in which each party's contract is observable to the rival party.  Then, we compared the
outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case.
Comparing the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation, we found that the higher-
valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation in the observable-contracts
case than in the unobservable-contracts case, whereas the lower-valuation player offers her
delegate greater contingent compensation in the unobservable-contracts case than in the
observable-contracts case.  We found also that the gap between the delegates' equilibrium
contingent compensation is narrower in the unobservable-contracts case than in the observable-
contracts case.  Comparing the equilibrium , we found that the equilibrium total effort levels total
effort level is greater  than in the unobservable-contracts case in the observable-contracts case.
Finally, comparing  the equilibrium expected payoffs, we found that the equilibrium expected
payoffs of the higher-valuation player and her delegate in the unobservable-contractsare less 
case in the observable-contracts case, nless  is very much greater than ,  than whereas, u thev v1 2
equilibrium expected payoffs of the lower-valuation player and her delegate in theare greater 
unobservable-contracts case in the observable-contracts case.  On the basis of than  this result, we
have argued that the higher-valuation player and her delegate prefer the observable-contracts
case (to the unobservable-contracts case), while the lower-valuation player and her delegate
prefer the unobservable-contracts case.  We have argued also that is beneficial to the lower-it 
valuation player and her delegate, the higher-valuation player and her delegate, but harmful to to
enact or establish policies or regulations or institutions that require both parties to release their
contracts in a two-player contest with bilateral delegation.
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 In the models that we have studied in this paper, public or private information is
exogenously assumed regarding contracts between the players and the delegates.  It would be
interesting to study an extended model in which the parties decide first whether they will release
the information on their delegation contracts.  However, that must involve a sizable analysis of
four distinct subgames including two unilateral-release subgames in which one party releases the
information on its delegation contract, but the other party does not.  Furthermore, it must focus
on the equilibrium decisions on releasing the information on the delegation contracts, which is
beyond the purpose of this paper.  Hence, we leave this extension for future research.
 In the models that we have studied in this paper, potential delegates have equal ability for
the contest.  It would be interesting to study corresponding models in which potential delegates
have different ability for the contest, and each potential delegate's reservation wage depends on
his ability.  In this paper, we have assumed that both players hire their delegates.  It would be
interesting to study corresponding extended models in which the players each have the option of
hiring a delegate.  We leave them for future research.
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Footnotes
1. A contest is defined as a situation in which players or contestants compete with one
another to win a prize.  The literature on the theory of contests which deals with rent-seeking
contests, tournaments, litigation, patent contests, sporting contests, all-pay auctions, etc. is
enormous and growing.  Important work in this literature includes Tullock (1980), Rosen (1986),
Appelbaum and Katz (1987), Dixit (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991), Nitzan
(1991), Baik and Shogren (1992), Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993), Clark and Riis (1998),
Hurley and Shogren (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Hvide (2002), Che and Gale (2003),
Szymanski (2003), Corchon (2007), Epstein and Nitzan (2007), Morgan and Vardy (2007),w w
Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008), Konrad (2009), Siegel (2009), and Gurtler and Munster.. ..
(2010).
2. We treat the game as a simultaneous-move game between the two parties because, in the
game, each party chooses its two sequential moves without observing the other party's moves.
3. In this paper, by the situation of "observable contracts," we mean a situation in which the
players announce publicly their delegation contracts and, furthermore, are committed to their
delegation contracts.
4. Important work in the literature on delegation that does not study contests includes
Schelling (1960), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai
(1991), and Katz (1991), (2006).
5. Katz (1991) shows that strategic effects may not be present with delegation if contracts
are unobservable.  Thus one may well say that, in this model, a main motive for delegation is not
for the players to achieve strategic commitments through delegation.  Delegation may occur here
because the players want to use superior ability of their delegates, and/or delegation is
compulsory.
6. Specifically, player  designs and offers a contract, which delegate accepts.i  i 
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7. Overall, the two parties play a simultaneous-move game, whatever the chronological
timing of their decisions may be: Each party chooses its two sequential actions specifically, a
contract and then an effort level without observing those chosen by the rival party.  According
to Baik and Lee (2007), the game is classified as a simultaneous-move game with sequential
moves.  Clearly, it differs from a standard two-stage game in which the first move of each party
is  by the rival party before the second moves of the parties are made.observed
8. Instead, we could assume that player  pays delegate compensation of if she winsi i v  αi i
the prize, and  if she loses it, where 0 and 1 (see Baik, 2007, 2008).  In this" " " αi i i i iv    
alternative contract specification, one may consider  as fixed compensation (or a fixed fee)"i iv
that is paid to delegate , regardless of the outcome of the contest, and ( )  as contingenti vα "i i i
compensation (or a contingent fee) which is paid to delegate  only if she wins the prize.  Usingi
the alternative contract specification, however, we obtain exactly the same (main) results,
because the value of subject to the nonnegativity constraint on that player  offers and" "i i   i
delegate accepts in equilibrium is zero.i 
9. This contest success function is extensively used in the literature on the theory of
contests.  Examples include Tullock (1980), Appelbaum and Katz (1987), Hillman and Riley
(1989), Nitzan (1991), Baik and Kim (1997), Hurley and Shogren (1998), Schoonbeek (2002,
2004, 2007), Lim and Shogren (2004), Baik (2004, 2007, 2008), Baik and Lee (2007), and Baik
and Lee (2013).  One may be tempted to assume that ( , ) ( ) for 0,p x  x x x x x xi r r ri1 2 1 21 2œ  Î 
where 0 1   In this case, however, except for the case where 1, it is not Ÿ œr . r
computationally tractable to analyze the model.
10. Throughout the paper, when we use  and  at the same time, we mean that .i j i jÁ
11. We find each player's contract and each delegate's effort level that are specified in a 
sequential equilibrium and also in a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
12. Each player's decision on her contract is not  affected by her beliefs about thedirectly
rival party's contract.  This is because the player's expected payoff does not depend  ondirectly
the rival party's contract and because the two parties play a simultaneous-move game.
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13. Note that player 's best response to ( , ) and delegate 's best response to ( , )i x i xα αj j j j
amount to their best responses to  delegate 's effort level , because their expected payoffsonly j xj
do not depend  on player 's contract  and because the two parties play a simultaneous-directly j αj
move game.
14. It is straightforward to see that  in (3) is strictly concave in , and thus the second-1i ix
order condition for maximizing (3) is satisfied.  Incidentally, the second-order condition is
satisfied for every maximization problem in the paper; for brevity that is not stated explicitly in
each case.
15. We use the computer program Mathematica to solve for the unknown .t
16. Schoonbeek (2002), Baik (2007, 2008), and Baik and Lee (2013) show that economic
rent for the delegate or delegates may exist.
17. On the other hand, Baik (2004) shows in two-player simultaneous-move asymmetric 
contests without delegation that, as the valuation of the higher-valuation player increases, the
equilibrium total effort level increases.
18. The contracts may not have strategic effects if they are not perfectly observed by the
delegates (see, for example, Bagwell, 1995).
19. The Nash equilibrium of the second-stage subgame satisfies the delegates' reaction
functions simultaneously.  Geometrically speaking, it occurs at the intersection of the delegates'
reaction functions.
20. We use the computer program Mathematica to solve for the unknown .k
21. If  is less than approximately 4.0755, then we obtain  (see Figure 2).  If  is less) )x x1 1* **
than approximately 9.5, then we obtain  (see Figure 4).G G* **2 2
22. In the literature on strategic delegation, there have been debates on whether strategic
effects are present with delegation when contracts are unobservable.  For an excellent survey of
this and other related issues, see Gal-Or (1997).  In this paper, player 1 makes her delegate more
aggressive or motivated in the observable-contracts case than in the unobservable-contracts case,
which may indicate that strategic effects may not be present with delegation when contracts are
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unobservable.  On the other hand, player 2 makes her delegate less aggressive or motivated in
the observable-contracts case than in the unobservable-contracts case, which may indicate that
strategic effects may be present with delegation when contracts are unobservable.
23. Using Propositions 2 and 4, we obtain also the fact that the unobservability of contracts
narrows, compared with the observable-contracts case, the gap between the delegates'
equilibrium expected payoffs and the gap between the players' equilibrium expected payoffs: In
terms of the symbols,  and, unless  is extremely large,1 1 1 1 )** * * **2 2 1 1  
G G G G** * * **2 2 1 1   .
24. Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) study duopolies with strategic managerial
delegation in which, when choosing their actions, the two managers know the delegation
contracts of both firms.  They find that, as compared with the no-delegation situation, bilateral
delegation increases outputs if the firms engage in quantity competition, and reduces prices if the
firms engage in price competition.  In the models, outputs are regarded as strategic substitutes,
while prices are regarded as strategic complements.  In this paper, bilateral delegation reduces
total effort both in the unobservable-contracts case and in the observable-contracts case, as
compared with the no-delegation situation.  However, both players do not regard their effort as
strategic complements.
25. In the literature on contests, effort expended in rent-seeking contests is interpreted as
social costs.
26. One may say that ignorance is bliss to the lower-valuation player and her delegate.
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Appendix: The Outcomes of the Observable-Contracts Case
LEMMA A1   1, 1 3, 12, ( , ) 1 2,If  then we obtain x x v p x x) α αœ œ Î Î Î** ** ** **1 2 1 2 1 22 1œ œ œ œ** **
1 1** **1 2 1 22 2œ œ œ œv and G G vÎ Î12, 3.** **
LEMMA A2   1, ( ) 1 (2 )  (1 2 ), ( )If then we obtain a k and k k b) α ) α ) ) œ Î  Î ** **1 2 œ
x k v k k and x k v k k c p x1 2 1** 3 3 2 ** 2 2 22 2 1œ œ) ) ) ) ) )Î   Î  (1 ) (1 2 )  (1 ) (1 2 ), ( ) ( ,**
x k k d kv k k k v k k and**2 1** 2 3 3 22 2) (1 ), ( ) (1 )(2 ) (1 ) (1 2 ) œ œ) ) 1 ) ) ) ) ) )Î  Î    Î  
1 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )** 2 2 2 22 12 2 2œ œkv k k k v k k and e  G kv k andÎ    Î   Î (1 )(1 2 ) (1 ) (1 2 ), ( ) (2 ) **
G v k where k is the unique positive real root of equation **2 2œ Î (1 2 ), (26).)
 Note that  in Lemma A2 is a positive real for any value of , where 1; it is equal tok ) )  
unity for 1; and  is monotonically increasing in .  Note also that 1 2 holds,) ) ) α αœ Ÿ  Îk  ** **1 2
and  and  do not depend separately on player 1's valuation for the prize and player 2'sα α** **1 2 1v  
valuation , but only on the parameter , the ratio of the players' valuations (of player 1 tov2 )
player 2).  Lemmas A1 and A2 are also reported, but without providing their full derivations, in
Appendix B in Baik and Lee (2013).
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Figure 4.  The Players’ Equilibrium Expected Payoffs in the Two Cases 
 
